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SCOLDED: CAN AN ATTORNEY APPEAL A

DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER FINDING
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT?
CarlaR. Pasquale*
This Note addresses the split among the United States courts of appeals
over whether an attorney can appeala district court'sfinding that he or she
has acted unprofessionally, even when there is no monetary sanction
imposed. After discussing the U.S. Constitution's Article III "case or
controversy" requirement and a district court's power to sanction
attorneys, this Note dissects the circuit split. It argues that attorneys should
have standing to appeal a court's finding of unprofessional conduct
because this type of sanction can cause irreparableharm to an attorney's
professionalreputation and thus to the attorney's business.
INTRODUCTION

Suppose that a district court makes a specific finding of fact that an
attorney has violated a rule of professional conduct. The district court then
orders the court clerk to mail a copy of the order finding ethical violations
to every court in which that attorney practices law.' Next, suppose that a
district court finds that an attorney did not act ethically when negotiating a
settlement. The court reprimands the attorney and orders that he or she
attend an attorneys' ethics course. 2 Finally, imagine that a district court
finds that an attorney has violated an ethics rule and orders the attorney to
pay a fine to the court as a sanction.
From which of these district court orders can the aggrieved attorney
appeal? This Note addresses the split among the United States courts of
appeals over whether an attorney can appeal a district court's finding that
he or she has acted unprofessionally, even when there is no monetary
sanction imposed. Part I of this Note addresses a district court's authority
to sanction an attorney and the different types of sanctions available. An
attorney's standing to appeal when that attorney is not an original party to
the case is also discussed in Part I. Additionally, this part discusses Article
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Griinne de B6rca for advising me during the writing process. I would also like to thank my
parents and three sisters for their love, support, and encouragement.
1. See Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1165-66 (10th Cir. 2003).
2. See Dawson v. United States, 68 F.3d 886, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1995).
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III's "case or controversy" requirement before addressing the nonparty rule
and the attorney exception to the nonparty rule. Part I next discusses the
circuit courts' general agreement that an attorney may only appeal a
sanction and introduces the circuit split over what is an appealable sanction.
Part II of this Note dissects and analyzes the circuit split over whether an
attorney can appeal a district court's decision or whether there must be
either a monetary sanction or an express reprimand in order for an attorney
to bring an appeal on his or her own behalf. Part III argues that courts of
appeals should have jurisdiction over an attorney's appeal from a district
court's order finding attorney misconduct. This part asserts that this is the
most appropriate rule because of the likely damage to an attorney's
professional reputation that will result, and because these appeals will not
cause a significant increase in litigation or jeopardize judicial candor.
Furthermore, these appeals should be allowed because courts of appeals are
unlikely to issue writs of mandamus in these cases, thus leaving aggrieved
attorneys with no relief.
I: JUDICIAL SANCTIONS AND AN ATTORNEY'S STANDING TO APPEAL
Part I discusses judicial sanctions imposed on attorneys for professional
misconduct. Part L.A examines district court judges' power to sanction
misbehaving attorneys, and the types of sanctions these judges may use.
Part I.A also discusses the level of severity at which judges sanction
attorneys. Part I.B introduces the U.S. Constitution's Article III "case or
controversy" requirement and appellate judges' duty to analyze their own
power to hear cases brought before them. Next, Part I.C discusses the rule
that an appellate court does not have jurisdiction over an appeal if the
petitioner is without standing, and only parties to a case generally have
standing to appeal. Part I.C also explains the attorney exception to this
nonparty rule. Part I.D discusses the circuit courts' agreement that
attorneys cannot appeal any and all criticism from a judge, and then
introduces the circuit split over whether a finding of attorney misconduct in
a district court order is an appealable sanction. Finally, Part I.E discusses a
sanctioned attorney's option to file a writ of mandamus against the district
court.
A. JudicialSanctions
Part L.A examines judicial sanctioning power and the types of sanctions
imposed on attorneys by judges. Part I.A. 1 explains judges' essential role
in maintaining integrity in their courtrooms by sanctioning unprofessional
attorney behavior. Part I.A.1 further discusses the various rules that
provide courts the power to sanction attorneys as well as courts' inherent
power to do so. Lastly, Part I.A.1 notes that attorneys usually choose to
sanction behavior that undermines the judicial system's integrity. Part
I.A.2 then examines the discretion of judges to determine the severity of
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sanctions imposed, and to choose between traditional and informal
sanctions.
1. Judicial Sanctioning Power
"Judges can be and ought to be key figures in maintaining integrity and
professionalism in the practice of law."' 3 One way for judges to perform
this crucial role is to sanction attorneys who practice in the judges' courts.
Federal judges primarily derive their power to sanction attorneys who act
unprofessionally from two sources: rules and the inherent judicial power to
sanction. 4 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 115 and 376 allow judges
to impose sanctions on lawyers who do not comply with rules pertaining to
motions, pleadings, or discovery. Also, some local district court rules give
courts the authority to sanction lawyers. 7 Finally, it is widely accepted that
federal courts have inherent power to regulate and sanction attorneys
appearing before them. 8 Federal courts "have long claimed the inherent

3. Randall T. Shepard, Wat Judges Can Do About Legal Professionalism, 32 WAKE
621, 622 (1997).
4. Judith A. McMorrow, Jackie A. Gardina & Salvatore Ricciardone, JudicialAttitudes
Toward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View from the Reported Decisions, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2004) ("[I]n federal courts judges may rely on Rule 11 and
Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as various discovery rules, to
establish norms of conduct and impose sanctions. Judges can supplement these rules with
their own creative responses using the court's inherent power .. "). Courts also have
statutory power to sanction attorneys. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) ("Any attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof
who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.").
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c); see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL
LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 5 (4th ed. 2008) (explaining the scope of Rule 11).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); JOSEPH, supra note 5, § 47(B) (explaining the scope of
Rule 37).
7. McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1440-41 (citing, for example, D. ARK. LOCAL R.
IV; D.D.C. LOCAL R. 16.2(c)(6)).
8. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-67 (1980); McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1440 (citing
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) ("[C]ourts ... are universally
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates .. ")); see also Ex
parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) ("The power is one which ought to be
exercised with great caution, but which is, we think, incidental to all Courts, and is necessary
for the preservation of decorum, and for the respectability of the profession."); Judith A.
McMorrow, Rule II and FederalizingLawyer Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 964 ("Both
federal and state courts have traditionally asserted an inherent power to regulate the practice
of law in their respective tribunals."). It is important to note, however, that "[a]lthough
district courts have relied on the inherent power to impose a range of sanctions, including
gag orders, fines, and even dismissals, they have not treated all wrongful conduct as
sanctionable." Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal Court Authority to Regulate
Lawyers: A Practicein Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1345 (2003).
FOREST L. REV.
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authority to manage their proceedings, including 'the authority
to impose
9
reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers."'
Several federal courts have even determined that it is a court's obligation
to supervise attorney conduct and take necessary steps to regulate it.I1 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York summed up this
idea: "Where doubt may becloud the public's view of the ethics of the legal
profession and thus impugn the integrity of the judicial process, it is the
responsibility of the court to ensure that the standards of ethics remain
high.""l However, Professor Judith A. McMorrow's review of case law has
shown that judges exercise their discretion in deciding when to impose
sanctions on an attorney for professional misconduct rather than viewing
12
sanctions as obligatory.
The key issue is when judges choose to sanction attorney misconduct.
"District courts.., appear to have adopted a hybrid approach-focusing
their attention on conduct that sullies the underlying litigation and judicial
system ....-13 In imposing sanctions, judges are primarily concerned with
the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system as well as the
maintenance of efficient judicial proceedings. 14

9. Zacharias & Green, supra note 8, at 1342 (quoting Flaksa v. Little River Marine
Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 888 (5th Cir. 1968)).
10. See, e.g., Saier v. State Bar of Mich., 293 F.2d 756, 760 (6th Cir. 1961) ("Lawyers
are officers of the court and the courts have a duty to supervise their conduct."); In re Shell
Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105, 108 (E.D. La. 1992) ("Federal courts have authority to remedy
litigation practices that threaten judicial integrity and the adversary processes. Indeed, the
'district court is obliged to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in connection
with any proceeding before it."' (quoting Musicus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 621 F.2d
742 (5th Cir. 1980))); Black v. State of Mo., 492 F. Supp. 848, 862 (W.D. Mo. 1980) ("'[I]t
appears to be the court's duty in a situation of this kind (where an appearance of impropriety
may result) to act sua sponte to determine if a breach of professional ethics has occurred or
is about to occur."' (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Am. Gym, Recreational &
Athletic Equip. Corp., 357 F. Supp. 905, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1973))); United States v.
Anonymous, 215 F. Supp. 111, 113 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) ("Courts are required mandatorily to
exercise this duty to preserve judicial decorum and to enforce the respectability of the legal
profession." (citing Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529)).
11. United States ex rel. Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423
F. Supp. 486, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
12. See McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1441.
13. Id. at 1442 ("Courts are concerned primarily with whether an attorney's behavior
taints the judicial process and by implication the system as a whole. Preservation of popular
faith with the judicial system is the court's foremost consideration."); see also Zacharias &
Green, supra note 8, at 1345 ("The courts. . . have limited the exercise of inherent authority
to conduct that has threatened the judicial process in some way .. ").See generally
Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and the Idea of a
Profession, 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1079, 1086 (2005) (noting courts' frustration as to drawing
the line between unethical conduct and zealous advocacy).
14. See McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1429 ("The picture that emerges from the
reporteddecisions in both state and federal courts is a desire to maintain the integrity of the
judicial process and a concern for the efficiency and fairness in the proceeding before the
court.").
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2. Types of Sanctions
District court judges must follow the Code of Conduct for United States
16
Judges,1 5 adopted in 1973 by the Judicial Conference of the United States.
The Code "prescribes ethical norms for federal judges as a means to
17
preserve the actual and apparent integrity of the federal judiciary."
Section (B)(3) of the Code states, "A judge should initiate appropriate
action when the judge becomes aware of reliable evidence indicating the
likelihood of unprofessional conduct by a judge or lawyer." 18 In assessing
what is "appropriate action," it is helpful to look at a comment to the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (used by state judges), 19 which asserts that
"[a]ppropriate action may include direct communication with the judge or
lawyer who has committed the violation, other direct action if available,
and reporting the violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or
body."

20

When deciding what type of sanction to impose, judges seem to match
the sanction's harshness with how negatively the attorney's professional
misconduct "affected the integrity of the judicial system."' 2 1 The sanctions
"must be proportional to the misconduct in question. '22 In fact, several
courts of appeals have expressed that judges should use sanctions with the

23
least severity necessary to serve the purpose of administering a sanction.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit explained this principle in

Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., noting that judges often are not
cognizant of how harmful their criticism can be to a lawyer's career. 24 A
15.

COMM. ON CODES OF CONDUCT, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR

UNITED STATES JUDGES (2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl.html
(last visited Aug. 15, 2008).
16. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
17. Id. All federal judges obtain a copy of the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges, which is updated periodically. Id.
18. Judicial Conference, supra note 15, Canon 3(B)(3).
19. See McMorrow et al., supranote 4, at 1430.
20. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3D(3) cmt. (2006). "This commentary
makes clear that reporting to the bar is not the exclusive sanction for misconduct."
McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1431; see also Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836
F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) ("What is 'appropriate' may be a warm friendly discussion on
the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court, compulsory legal education, monetary
sanctions, or other measures appropriate to the circumstances.").
21. McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1440.
22. Zacharias & Green, supra note 8, at 1346.
23. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878 ("[T]his Court has previously held that the basic
principle governing the choice of sanctions is that the least severe sanction adequate to serve
the purpose should be imposed." (citing Boazman v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 537 F.2d 210, 212-13
(5th Cir. 1976))); Reizakis v. Loy, 490 F.2d 1132, 1136 (4th Cir. 1974); Indus. Bldg.
Materials, Inc. v. Interchem. Corp., 437 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir. 1970)); see also Zacharias
& Green, supra note 8, at 1346 (citing Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d
885, 886 (5th Cir. 1968)).
24. See Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878 ("'Judges are prone to forget the sting of public
criticism delivered from the bench ....
There is a distinction between bad practice and lack
of integrity. Being guilty of the former does not invariably justify a charge of the later."'
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district court should impose sanctions "with care, specificity, and attention
to the sources of its power" 25 because, "unless an attorney's questionable
conduct threatens to taint the litigation pending before the court, 'the
business of the court is to dispose of litigation and not to act as a general
overseer of the ethics of those who practice [t]here. '"'26 When courts do
sanction attorneys, the sanctions are described as either traditional sanctions
27
or informal sanctions.
a. TraditionalSanctions
Traditional sanctions are usually based on rules and "encompass the
long-established responses to attorney misconduct. '28 These sanctions
include disqualification from a case, assessment of costs, and referral to a
disciplinary committee, and "are designed primarily to ensure the integrity
of the system and regulate conduct before the court."'29 For example, in
Lasar v. Ford Motor Co.,30 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Montana both fined and disqualified an attorney for making misleading
statements to the district court in his sworn application for pro hac vice
status. 3 1
b. Informal Sanctions
32
Informal sanctions, unlike traditional sanctions, are not rule-based.
They "include a court's decision to issue an opinion, naming the recalcitrant
attorney, outlining his or her misdeeds in detail, and describing the court's
disappointment and outrage." 33 These informal sanctions "combine the
(quoting William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New FederalRule ] -A CloserLook,
104 F.R.D. 181, 201 (1985))).
25. MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1996).
26. In re Shell Oil Refinery, 143 F.R.D. 105, 108 (E.D. La. 1992) (quoting

MMRiWallace Power & Indus., Inc. v. Thames Assocs., 764 F. Supp. 712, 718 (D. Conn.
1991)).
27. See McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1452.

28. Id.
29. Id. at 1453.
30. 239 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (D. Mont. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 399 F.3d 1101

(9th Cir. 2005).
31. Id. at 1022.
32. See McMorrow et al.,
supra note 4,at 1453.

33. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at * 10-11, Matlaw v. Cole, 128 S.Ct. 302
(2007) (No. 07-121), 2007 WL 2220373 (describing two types of "discrediting sanctions"

"settled sanction" cases (when monetary sanctions have been imposed and then vacated or
settled), and cases in which no monetary sanctions have been imposed, but the district court
uses harmful language to admonish the attorney). Various courts have used strong language
in written opinions to reprimand attorneys. See e.g., United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961,
969-70 (7th Cir. 1999) ("We do not think formal disciplinary action [is] required in the

circumstances, but we take this opportunity to remind the bar of its duty to avoid needless
duplication in the briefing of multiple-party appeals."); Fla. Breckenridge, Inc. v. Solvay
Pharms., Inc., 174 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("In this case, the attorneys for both

parties have frustrated the system of justice, which depends on their candor and loyalty to
the court, because they wanted to avoid an unpleasant truth about their clients' conduct. 'In
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power of the written word with the importance of an attorney's reputation
'34
to impress upon an attorney (and the bar) the gravity of the conduct.
Informal sanctions are more efficient than traditional sanctions because
they allow courts to speak to the whole legal community about how lawyers
should conduct themselves professionally. 35 "While traditional sanctions
and informal sanctions are often used in tandem, it is through informal
sanctions that courts communicate directly with the attorneys .
-.36 This
Note addresses the question of whether attorneys should be permitted to
appeal a district court's imposition of these informal sanctions37 and, if so,
under what circumstances attorneys should be allowed to do so.
B. Article III's "Case or Controversy" Requirement
Article III, section 2 of the Constitution states,
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; -to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; -to
all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party; -to Controversies between two
or more States; -between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; -between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 38
One must present a "case" or "controversy" in order to have standing to
sue or to appeal. 39 This standing requirement of Article III limits federal
judges because they only possess the power to resolve cases and
controversies. 40 "If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts
have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing
so." 4 1 Adherence to Article III's "case or controversy" requirement is a
way to guarantee that the federal courts are not given unlimited
short, they have sold out to the client."' (quoting Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d
1536, 1547 (11 th Cir. 1993))); Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1546 ("[I]t is appalling that attorneys,
like defense counsel in this case, routinely twist the discovery rules into some of 'the most
powerful weapons in the arsenal of those who abuse the adversary system for the sole
benefit of their clients."' (quoting Tommy Prud'homme, The Need for Responsibility Within
the Adversary System, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 443, 460 (1990))).
34. McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1453.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 1454. The court in Lasar v. FordMotor Co. used both traditional sanctions of
fines and disqualification, and informal sanctions, including writing in its opinion that the
attorney's conduct was "egregious" and accusing him of giving "twisted testimony." Lasar
v. Ford Motor Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1032-34 (D. Mont. 2003).
37. See infra Parts II, 111.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 1.
39. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37-38 (1976).
40. Id.
41. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006).
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jurisdiction. 42 To follow Article III, federal courts must analyze their own
43
power to hear cases brought before them.
The question of jurisdiction is an important inquiry in maintaining the
federal courts' limited role established by Article III. Federal courts have
an obligation to determine whether they have proper jurisdiction over an
44
appeal.
"On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is
that of jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which
the record comes. This question the court is bound to ask and answer for
itself, even when not otherwise
suggested, and without respect to the
45
relation of the parties to it."

Appellate judges must remain constantly aware of the question of
jurisdiction in every case that comes before them 4 6 because "[t]he
requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter 'spring[s]
from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is
'inflexible and without exception.'

47

C. The Nonparty Rule and the Attorney Exception

If a petitioner is without standing, a court of appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the petitioner's appeal. 48 It is a well-established rule that
only parties to a case have standing to appeal a judgment rendered against
them.49 This rule includes parties who have properly intervened in a case in
50
addition to those parties who were part of the original controversy.
However, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the U.S. Supreme Court
established three requirements for standing. 5 1 First, "the plaintiff must have
suffered an 'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not
42. Id. at 341-42.

43. See id.
44. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
45. Id. (citing Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900)); see
also Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal and the Right to
Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REv. 813, 838-39 (2004) ("When a
court determines a person's... standing to appeal, it is deciding whether the person... is a
proper party to bring a particular issue to an appellate court for review. In essence, the
question is whether that person is entitled to have an appeals court decide the merits of the
dispute, or at least particular issues that the appellant contends were erroneously decided in
the trial court.").
46. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94 (citing Great S. FireProofHotel, 177 U.S. at 453).
47. Id. at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382
(1884)).
48. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61 (1992).
49. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304 (1988) ("The rule that only parties to a
lawsuit ... may appeal an adverse judgment, is well settled."); see also Joan Steinman,
Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who are Not Full-Fledged Parties,39 GA. L.
REV.411, 484 (2005).
50. See Marino, 484 U.S. at 304.
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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conjectural or hypothetical.' '52 Second, "there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of."153 Finally, "it must be
'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,' that the injury will be
'redressed by a favorable decision.' 54 The Lujan court did not articulate a
"party" requirement, 55 which suggests that one need not always be a party
to a case in order to bring an appeal.
Also, courts have articulated an attorney exception to the nonparty rule,
56
finding that sanctioned attorneys may, in some cases, appeal a decision.
Undoubtedly, a sanctioned attorney has suffered an "injury in fact," thus
meeting one of the standing requirements articulated by the Supreme Court
in Lujan.57 Although the circuit courts differ in their opinions on which
types of sanctions are appealable, 58 there is general agreement among
courts that attorneys may appeal an adverse judgment. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained, "There is no doubt at all but
that at some point an attorney subject to a sanction may appeal. '59 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has decided that it has
jurisdiction over an attorney's appeal if a district court's order has
"'directly aggrieve[d]" the attorney. 60 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has stated that "[a]s an exception to [the] general rule, a
nonparty such as an attorney who is held in contempt or otherwise
sanctioned by the court in the course of litigation may appeal from the order
imposing sanctions." 6 1 Several circuit courts have even addressed the issue
of jurisdiction over an attorney's appeal without even mentioning the
nonparty rule, treating as implicit the notion that attorneys have standing to
62
appeal an adverse finding.
D. Sanction Requirement
Whereas the circuit courts may disagree over the question of what
constitutes an appealable attorney sanction, 63 they generally do agree on

52. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
53. Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
54. Id. (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
55. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
57. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
58. See infra Part II.
59. Bartels v. Sports Arena Employees Local 137, 838 F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1988).
60. Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 230 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2000)).
61. Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing
U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988);
Sanders Assocs. v. Summagraphics Corp., 2 F.3d 394, 395-98 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000); Weissman v.
Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92
(Ist Cir. 1998); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1997); Sullivan

v. Comm. on Admissions & Grievances, 395 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
63. See infra Part II.
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what is never appealable. 64 In In re Williams, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit noted that "not every criticism by a judge that offends a
lawyer's sensibilities is a sanction. '65 In United States v. Talao, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, "We do not invite appellate
review of every unwelcome word uttered or written by the district courts." ' 66
A district court's general "expressi[on] [of] disapproval of a lawyer's
behavior" will not suffice. 6 7 Most circuit courts have required some degree
of formality in the reprimands given by district courts before deciding that
they have jurisdiction to hear an attorney's appeal. 6 8 According to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, "only where the district court makes
a formal, particularized finding of misconduct that exists independent of the
court's other factual and legal findings" is the order an appealable
69
sanction.
Currently, there is a circuit split over whether a district court's order
finding attorney misconduct is considered an appealable sanction. 70 The
courts of appeals take different approaches to answering the question of
"whether an order damaging only an attorney's professional reputation and
not accompanied by any other form of sanction can be appealed": 7 1 (a) the
order must impose a monetary sanction to be appealable; (b) the order must
be likely to damage the attorney's professional reputation to be appealable;
and (c) the order sanctioning the attorney must express definite formality as
72
a reprimand to be appealable.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is the only circuit
which has ruled that an attorney can only appeal when the court has
formally sanctioned the attorney by imposing a fine. 73 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as well as the Tenth and Fifth
Circuits take the approach that an attorney may appeal an order including a
reprimand that could potentially damage his or her career, holding that,
when a court makes a declaration of an attorney's professional misconduct,

64. See Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 543 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Most courts agree that
mere judicial criticism is insufficient to constitute a sanction." (citing Talao, 222 F.3d at
1138; Williams, 156 F.3d at 90; Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984))).
65. Williams, 156 F.3d at 90.
66. Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138.
67. Id.
68. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
69. In re Harris, 51 F. App'x 952, 956 (6th Cir. 2002). In In re Harris,while the district
court acknowledged that the prosecutor knowingly produced a witness that would give false
testimony, the court refused to discuss further the prosecutor's professional misconduct.
Because the court's acknowledgement did not exist as an independent order finding
professional misconduct, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit would not hear the
attorney's appeal. Id. at 954.
70. For a full description of the circuit split, see infra Part II.
71. Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 1167-68.
73. See Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007); Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744
F.2d 572, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the statement alone may be appealable. 74 Finally, the First Circuit has
landed somewhere in between the views of the other circuits, holding that
"[w]ords alone may suffice if they are expressly identified as a
reprimand. ' 75 In Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., the Ninth Circuit agreed
with the First Circuit's reasoning. 76 Additionally, in Talao, the Ninth
Circuit held that, because a district court found a violation of a specific
ethical rule, the order contained the "requisite" formality to be an
appealable sanction. 77 Lastly, the Federal Circuit held in Precision
Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States that an "explicit and formal"
78
reprimand was appealable.
E. Writ of Mandamus
If an attorney does not have standing to appeal a district court's order
finding attorney misconduct, he or she still has the option to file a writ of
mandamus against the district court. 79 A court's power to issue writs of
mandamus is derived from the All Writs Act. 80 A writ of mandamus is "[a]
writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government
81
officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly."
Writs of mandamus have "been used 'to confine an inferior court to a
lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction.' 82 However, the writ of
mandamus "is seldom issued and its use is discouraged. '83 "Moreover, it is
within a court's discretion to refrain from issuing the writ even when the
requirements for mandamus are technically satisfied. The availability of
the writ 'does not compel its exercise."' 84 Use of the writ "is a drastic
remedy that a court should grant only in extraordinary circumstances in
response to an act amounting to a judicial usurpation of power" 85 because
'86
there is a strong hesitation to "mak[e] the judge a litigant.
74. See Butler, 348 F.3d at 1168-69; Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832-33
(5th Cir. 1997); Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & Grievances, 395 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
75. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998).
76. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge, Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1199-200 (9th Cir. 1999).
77. United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
78. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir.
2003). The court also placed a heavy emphasis on the damage to the attorney's professional
reputation likely to result from the district court's order. Id.
79. 9 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

110.28 (2d ed. 1996)

("[Tihe writ may issue to review conduct that is not otherwise reviewable by appeal.").
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (2000) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by
Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."); see also Hahnemann Univ.
Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 460 (3d Cir. 1996).
81. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004).

82. In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Will v. Calvert
Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978)).
83. Id. (quoting Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988)).
84. Id. (quoting Lusardi, 855 F.2d at 1070).
85. Id.; see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 209
(1989) ("(W]e have required that petitioners demonstrate a 'clear abuse of discretion' or
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II: DISSECTING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER A COURT OF APPEALS HAS
JURISDICTION OVER AN ATTORNEY'S APPEAL FROM A DISTRICT COURT'S
ORDER FINDING ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT

Part II dissects the circuit split over whether an attorney can appeal a
district court's order finding professional misconduct. Part II.A discusses
the Seventh Circuit's cases allowing an attorney to appeal monetary
sanctions only. Part II.B examines the Tenth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuit cases
permitting an attorney to appeal sanctions that will likely cause injury to the
attorney's reputation. Finally, Part II.C discusses the First, Ninth, and
Federal Circuit approach, which allows an attorney to appeal formal
sanctions.
A. Appealing Monetary Sanctions Only: The Seventh CircuitApproach
1. Bolte v. Home Insurance Co.
The Seventh Circuit first addressed the question of whether an attorney
may appeal a district court's finding of his or her professional misconduct
in Bolte v. Home Insurance Co.8 7 In Bolte, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin found that the defendant's two attorneys,
Terrence Joy and Thomas Hamlin, concealed from the plaintiff inconsistent
statements made by one of the defendant's witnesses and also hid from the
plaintiff the defendant's witness's name and address. 88 The district judge
called Joy and Hamlin's behavior "reprehensible," and, after the parties had
settled, the district court judge refused to vacate his finding describing the
attorneys' conduct in this manner. 89
The attorneys argued that the court should permit them to appeal the
district judge's order because it might lead to disciplinary proceedings in
their home state, and moreover, the order had caused damage to their
reputations.9" However, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, ruling that it did not
believe that this sort of finding is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which
states that "[t]he courts of appeals.. . shall have jurisdiction of appeals
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States." 9 1 The
-court reasoned that if it allowed appeals from district court orders finding
conduct amounting to 'usurpation of [the judicial] power."' (quoting Bankers Life &
Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)); De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United
States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)); MOORE ET AL., supra note 79, 110.28, at 347 (describing
the serious circumstances under which appellate courts have granted writs of mandamus to
"prevent district judges from embarking on frolics of their own").
86. Chambers, 148 F.3d at 223 (setting out as the prerequisites for issuance of a writ of
mandamus, "the jurisdictional prerequisite inherent in the language of §1651(a)," "that
petitioner have no other adequate means to attain the desired relief," and "that petitioner
meets its burden of showing that its right to the writ is clear and indisputable").
87. 744 F.2d 572, 572-73 (7th Cir. 1984).
88. See id. at 572.
89. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id.
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); Bolte, 744 F.2d at 572-73.
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attorney misconduct, "a breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction
would be presaged" and "[s]uch appeals would be
particularly
92
unmanageable because usually there would be no appellee."
The court recognized that the shame attached to a district court's finding
of "reprehensible" conduct might actually satisfy the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement, but the court believed that Congress, in enacting
28 U.S.C. § 1291, did not intend "to allow people who were not even
parties to a lawsuit in the district court to appeal from a wounding or critical
93
or even palpably injurious comment or finding by a district judge."
Attorneys Joy and Hamlin initially sought a writ of mandamus against
94
the district judge in this case, which the court of appeals refused.
However, the court suggested that a writ of mandamus is actually the
appropriate remedy for attorneys aggrieved by a district court's reprimand
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which states that "courts ... may issue all writs

necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
95
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
2. Seymour v. Hug
Thirteen years after Bolte, the Seventh Circuit once again addressed the
appealabilty of nonmonetary sanctions ordered by district courts. 96 In
Seymour v. Hug, attorneys appealed a finding that they acted dishonestly in
the course of a settlement proceeding. 97 The district court judge found that
during the settlement negotiations, the plaintiff and her attorneys
represented potential harm to the plaintiffs children. 9 8 As a result, the
defendants agreed to a settlement that covered the plaintiff/mother's claims
and any potential claims of her children. 99 The plaintiff then petitioned to
the surrogate court, arguing that all of the settlement money should go to
her and that her children had no separate claims.100 Because the original
settlement was largely based on the children's potential independent claims,

92. Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573. But see Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163,

1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (reasoning that the lack of appellees is not problematic because the
court will review both the appellant's brief and the district court's order that provides the
reasoning behind the sanction); In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 97 (1st Cir. 1998) (Rosenn, J.,
dissenting) ("An appeal in such situations is no more unopposed than is an appeal from
monetary sanctions."); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at 18.
93. Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573.
94. Id. For a discussion regarding the improbability of courts granting writs of
mandamus in informal sanctions cases, see infra Part III.B.
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1651; Bolte, 744 F.2d at 573. For more information on writs of
mandamus, see supra Part I.E.
96. See Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2007).
97. Id. at 928.
98. Id. at 927.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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and her attorneys acted dishonestly
the district court held that the plaintiff
01
during the settlement proceedings.1
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by stating the general nonparty
rule that "'a nonparty cannot challenge on appeal the rulings of a district
court.'

102

The court then described the Seventh Circuit's general

exception to the nonparty rule that "an attorney can bring an appeal on her
own behalf when challenging a district court decision imposing monetary
sanctions on the attorney, but this rule does not allow an appeal of
the district court when no monetary
otherwise critical comments 10by
3
imposed.'
been
have
sanctions
The court recognized that the other circuits disagree with the Seventh
Circuit precedent but also pointed out that the other circuits are split among
themselves over whether the court must formally sanction an attorney in
order for the attorney to appeal.' 0 4 The Seventh Circuit adopted its own
reasoning in Bolte 10 5 and explained that its decision in Seymour was
compatible with the court's precedent of "review[ing] ... judgments, not
statements in opinions."' 1 6 Finally, as it did in Bolte, 10 7 the court pointed
the option to petition for a writ of mandamus
out that attorneys still have
08
against the district judge. 1
In July 2007, Leslie V. Matlaw, the aggrieved attorney in Seymour,
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 10 9 Among her
or0
arguments, Matlaw pointed out that one does not need access to Westlaw 11
Lexis Nexis to find and read judicial opinions chastising attorneys.
"[E]ven 'unpublished' opinions are immediately available ... [by] anyone
possessed of even the most rudimentary familiarity with the Internet-

101. Id. at 927-28.
102. Id. at 929 (quoting Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 475 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir.
2007)); see also supra Part I.C. 1.
103. Seymour, 485 F.3d at 929 (citing Crews & Assocs. v. United States, 458 F.3d 674,
677 (7th Cir. 2006); Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir.
1992)); see also Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 976 P.2d 545, 549 (Okla. 1999) (refusing
to hear an appeal of a nonmonetary sanction).
104. See Seymour, 485 F.3d at 929.
105. See id. (citing Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984)); see also
Pamela A. MacLean, No Recourse for Bash from Bench: In 7th Circuit, Lawyer Can't
Appeal Judge's Critique, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 2007, at 4 (explaining the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Seymour).
106. Seymour, 485 F.3d at 929 (quoting EEOC v. Chi. Club, 86 F.3d 1423, 1431 (7th Cir.
1996)); see also, e.g., Acevedo v. Canterbury, 457 F.3d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e
'review judgments, not opinions."' (quoting Rubel v. Pfizer Inc., 361 F.3d 1016, 1020 (7th
Cir. 2004))).
107. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
108. See Seymour, 485 F.3d at 929; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000); Clark Equip. Co. v.
Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992). For a discussion about the
improbability of courts granting writs of mandamus in informal sanctions cases, see infra
Part III.B.
109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33.
110. Id. at*14-15.
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basically, everyone in the world.""'I l Matlaw also argued that potential
clients and opposing counsel can easily "Google" an attorney and find the
attorney's website as well as a link to the judicial opinion with the
reprimand. 1 2 "An appellate decision (reversing, vacating, or even
examining but ultimately affirming that order) would likewise be generated
113
in that web search, thus . . . rendering precisely the relief sought."'

Matlaw also asserted that the "avalanche of cases"' 14 that the court
16
and that the "lack of an appellee"
anticipated in Bolte 1 5 had not accrued
117
either.
had not been problematic
Finally, Matlaw asserted that attorneys will not argue as vigorously for
their clients if they are only allowed to appeal monetary sanctions. 118 She
suggested that if an attorney does not have a right to appeal a district court's
finding of attorney misconduct, this will "chill zealous advocacy." 119 She
contended that, without the possibility of appeal, an attorney might be
hesitant to advocate fervently on behalf of a client, fearing that the judge
might issue a sanction with no regard for its effect on the attorney's
reputation. 120 Matlaw also wrote that, without the possibility of appeal, an
attorney could even violate ethical rules prohibiting conflicts of interest if
he or she does not advocate zealously. 12 1 The Supreme Court denied
Matlaw's petition for a writ of certiorari in October 2007.122
B. Appealing Sanctions That Could Damage an Attorney's Professional
Reputation: The Tenth, Fifth, andD.C. CircuitApproach
1. Tenth Circuit: Butler v. Biocore Medical Technologies,Inc.
In Butler v. Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc., an attorney, Tim Butler,
appealed from the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas's finding
that he had violated several rules of professional conduct. 123 The district
court found that he had violated District of Kansas Rule 83.5.4, concerning
"pro hac vice requirements for involvement of local counsel," and District
of Kansas Rule 26.3, "requiring the filing of notice of service of discovery
111. Id.; see also Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2003).

112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *15.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at *16.
Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *16.

117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at *23 ("Restricting the fight of appellate review necessarily limits how
vigorously any attorney will represent a [c]lient once the representation has been secured.").
119. Id. at*23-24.
120. See id. at *23 (citing United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1047 (10th Cir.
1999) (Baldock, J., dissenting)).
121. See id. at *24 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002)).

122. Matlaw v. Hug, 128 S. Ct. 302 (2007).
123. See Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003).
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disclosures, requests, or responses."' 124 The district court also found a
violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d), "requiring the filing of
papers that have been served on a party be given to the court clerk," and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(b)(1), "requiring notice to all parties of
subpoenas". 125 Finally, the district court found that Butler violated Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g), "providing that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to 'engage in any.., conduct that adversely
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law,""' 126 and Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, "requiring attorneys to avoid the
appearance of impropriety." 127 Furthermore, and perhaps most harmful to
Butler, the district court ordered that the court clerk mail a copy of its
128
findings to all the courts in which Butler was admitted to practice.
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the question of jurisdiction to hear the
attorney's appeal. 129 The court concluded that it had jurisdiction over these
appeals from attorneys as long as the final judgment has "'directly
aggrieve[d]"' the attorney. 130 The court also stated that it could hear an
attorney's appeal if the attorney has been 'injured in the legal sense"' by
13 1
the district court's order.
The court posed the question in this case of "when, if ever, an order...
affecting an attorney's professional reputation imposes a legally sufficient
injury to support appellate jurisdiction."' 132 The Tenth Circuit took the
position that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,133 it does have jurisdiction to hear an
attorney's appeal from a district court's finding of a professional conduct
violation without monetary sanctions and without express language of a
reprimand. 134 The court provided three reasons for its decision. First, the
court found "that damage to an attorney's professional reputation is a
cognizable and legally sufficient injury."'1 35 Second-confronting the
124. Id. at 1165-66.
125. Id. at 1165.
126. Id.

at 1166

(quoting KAN.

SUP. CT. R.

226,

available at http://www.ks

courts.org/rules/Rule-Info.asp?rl=Rules+Relating+to+Discipline+of+Attomeys&r2=57,
mentioning that this rule is not found in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).

and

127. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1166.
128. Id.

129. Id. (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998)).
130. Id. at 1166-67 (quoting Weeks v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 230 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir.

2000), which held that an attorney has standing to appeal a disqualification order because it
is a sanction that "directly aggrieve[s]" him).
131. Id. 348 F.3d at 1167 (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 344 F.3d 1036, 1039 (10th
Cir. 2003)). Several months before deciding Butler v. Biocore Medical Technologies, Inc.,

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Gonzales recognized the
circuit split but did not yet take a side. Gonzales, 344 F. 3d at 1039-40.
132. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1167.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000) ("The courts of appeals..,

shall have jurisdiction of

appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ....
134. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1168.
135. Id. (citing Weeks, 230 F.3d at 1207; Johnson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 85 F.3d
489, 492-93 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir.

1992) (noting that an attorney must "bear that serious sanction of published opinions
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concern that attorney appeals such as these would not be contested, and
thus would undermine the adversarial approach-the Tenth Circuit pointed
out that it reviews not only the petitioner's brief, but also the district court's
' 136
order so that the court "will not 'hear only one side of the story."
Finally-in response to the argument that the court's approach would lead
to "excessive appellate supervision"-the Tenth Circuit explained that such
an outcome would not occur because of the deferential "no reasonable
basis" standard that the court employs when reviewing the district court's
137
order.
2. Fifth Circuit: Walker v. City of Mesquite
In Walker v. City of Mesquite, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question of
whether an attorney could appeal a district court's finding of attorney
misconduct. 138 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas
of "blatant misconduct" and of
found attorney Thomas Peebles guilty
"violat[ing] his obligation of candor."' 139
The Walker appellees argued that the court of appeals should not have
jurisdiction because the only result of the district court's findings would be
a mere blow to Peebles's professional reputation. 140 The appellees cited the
Seventh Circuit's Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts Manufacturing Co.,
which only allowed appeals from monetary sanctions; 141 however, the Fifth
Circuit strongly disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's result. The Fifth
Circuit provided the following argument against the Seventh Circuit's
monetary sanction requirement:
Stripped to essentials this proposition would maintain that an attorney has
more of a reason and interest in appealing the imposition of a $100 fine
than appealing a finding and declaration by a court that counsel is an
unprofessional lawyer prone to engage in blatant misconduct. We reject
this proposition out of hand, being persuaded beyond peradventure that

chastising him by name"); United States v. Schrimser, 493 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1974)
(discussing the importance of an attorney's reputation in a community).
136. See Butler, 348 F.3d at 1169 (quoting In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir.
1998)).
137. Id.
138. See Walker v. City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 831-33 (5th Cir. 1997).
139. Id. at 832. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
stating the general rule that an attorney cannot appeal a sanction until a final order has been
given in the district court. Id. However, the court recognized an exception to this general
rule, allowing attorneys to appeal prejudgment when they are no longer counsel in the
underlying litigation. Id. Because Thomas Peebles was no longer part of the original case,
he was able to raise an appeal. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. The appellees cite Clark Equipment Co. v. Lift Parts Manufacturing Co., 972
F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992). For a further discussion on Seventh Circuit precedent, see
supra Part II.A.
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one's professional reputation is a lawyer's most important and valuable
asset. 142

In furtherance of its argument that an attorney should be permitted to appeal
a sanction which harms his or her professional reputation, the Fifth Circuit
quoted Justice John Paul Stevens's dissenting opinion in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp.: "'Despite the changes that have taken place at the bar
since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still believe that most lawyers
are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is their professional
reputation. ' 143
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's findings did
constitute an appealable sanction, despite the lack of monetary
accountability or explicit reprimand. 144 The court also mentioned that
courts of appeals have an interest in exercising jurisdiction over appeals
such as these because it is their "duty to assure that lawyers, as officers of
' 14 5
the court, live up to their ethical responsibilities.'
3. D.C. Circuit: Sullivan v. Committee on Admissions & Grievances
In Sullivan v. Committee on Admissions & Grievances, a disciplinary
146
committee found that an attorney had violated several Canons of Ethics.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia actually dismissed the
charges that the committee had issued against the attorney, but the court
still found that the attorney had violated the Canons of Ethics. 147 The
48
attorney appealed this finding. 1
The D.C. Circuit ruled that, because the district court's fmding of a
violation of the Canons of Ethics is harmful to the attorney's professional
reputation, the attorney had standing to appeal the finding. 149 The court's
terse reasoning included that "[the attorney]'s posture is not unlike that of
50
an accused who is found guilty but with penalties suspended."'

142. Walker, 129 F.3d at 832; see also Cities Serv. Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 976 P.2d 545,
550 (Okla. 1999) (Opala, J., dissenting) ("Given the importance of a lawyer's professional
reputation and standing, the right to appeal from a decision that visits discipline should not
depend on the form of inflicted sanction." (citing Walker, 129 F.3d at 832)).
143. Walker, 129 F.3d at 832 n.3 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384, 412 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); see also FDIC v.
Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A lawyer's reputation
for integrity, thoroughness and competence is his or her bread and butter.").
144. See Walker, 129 F.3d at 832-33.
145. Id. at 833 n.5.
146. See Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & Grievances, 395 F.2d 954, 955-56 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
147. Id. at 956.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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C. Appealing Sanctions That Are ConsideredFormal: The First,Ninth,
and FederalCircuitApproach
1. First Circuit: In re Williams
In Williams, two attorneys, Charles J. Cannon and William Blagg, sought
to appeal a bankruptcy court's findings that were upheld by the U.S.
District Court for the District of Rhode Island. 15 1 The bankruptcy court
ordered Rule 37(b) sanctions 152 on Cannon and Blagg for failing to produce
certain documents on time. 153 The judge additionally ordered each attorney
to pay a $750 fine. 154 The judge later decided that Blagg need not pay the
fine but nonetheless did not vacate the monetary sanction against Cannon or
the court's findings that both lawyers acted unprofessionally. 155 On appeal
to the District Court of Rhode Island, the court lifted the monetary
sanction 156 but did not vacate the findings of fact criticizing the lawyers'
157
behavior.
The First Circuit opined that the question of whether the attorneys could
appeal the bankruptcy court's negative findings of fact "depend[ed] on
whether the findings, simpliciter, comprise[d] a decision, order, judgment,
or decree[,]" as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 158 The First Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court's critical findings of fact were not
appealable.159
The court based its analysis on the "legal significance" of the bankruptcy
court's criticism. 160 While the court recognized that the lower court's
published opinion was both "explicit and unflattering,"'16 1 "[s]till, it is an
abecedarian rule that federal appellate courts review decisions, judgments,
orders, and decrees-not opinions, factual findings, reasoning, or
explanations."' 162 The court acknowledged that the attorneys might suffer
damage to their professional reputations, but pointed out that the
151. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 88-89 (1st Cir. 1998).
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (governing sanctions for "[flailure to [m]ake [d]isclosure or
[c]ooperate in [d]iscovery"); see also JOSEPH, supra note 5, at ch. 7.
153. Williams, 156 F.3d at 88.
154. Id.

155. Id.
156. Id. at 89. Technical considerations under Rule 37(b)(2) caused the district court
judge to annul the sanctions imposed by the bankruptcy court. "Sanctions under Rule
37(b)(2) may not be levied without the issuance, and subsequent violation, of a formal order
under Rule 37(a)." Id. at 89 n. 1 (citing R.W. Int'l Corp. v. Welch Foods, Inc., 937 F.2d 11,
19 (lst Cir. 1991)).

157. Id. at 89.
158. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2000) ("The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees ....
"));
see also 28
U.S.C. § 1291 ("The courts of appeals... shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States ....
159. See Williams, 156 F.3d at 90.
160. Id. at 89.
161. Id. at 89-90.
162. Id. at 90.
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16 3
bankruptcy court actually had vacated the intended sanctions-the fines.
The court decided that it lacked jurisdiction "[b]ecause no sanction
1 64
remain[ed]."'
The First Circuit's justification for its ruling lies in its reading of the
bankruptcy court's findings, which it found were "not the sanction itself,
but, rather, served to justify the imposition of monetary sanctions" that

were then vacated.

165

The court also raised the problem that most attorney appeals of this type
will not have appellees. "This means, of course, that a reviewing court will
hear only one side of the story, and will be deprived of the balanced
adversarial presentation that is so helpful to the proper functioning of the
appellate process." 166 Furthermore, the First Circuit was concerned with
the possible effect on judicial candor if judges' critical statements were
made appealable. 16 7 As a result of all of these considerations, the court
held:
[A] jurist's derogatory comments about a lawyer's conduct, without more,
do not constitute a sanction. A trial judge has the obligation to assure the
proper conduct of proceedings in his or her court, and must retain the
power to comment, sternly when necessary, on a lawyer's performance
16 8
without wondering whether those comments will provoke an appeal.
The First Circuit believed that the appealability of sanctions would deter
judges from sanctioning attorneys in the first place. 169 "We cannot expect
judges to preside effectively over discovery and trials, and yet routinely
subject them to appeals from critical comments reflecting their displeasure
1 70
with the conduct of those they are charged with controlling."
The court made it expressly clear that it disagreed with the Seventh
Circuit's precedent that only monetary sanctions can serve as the basis of an
appeal:
Sanctions are not limited to monetary imposts. Words alone may suffice
if they are expressly identified as a reprimand. But critical comments
made in the course of a trial court's wonted functions-say, factfinding or

163. See id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 91. But see Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th
Cir. 2003) (noting that courts review both the appellant's brief and the original district court
order); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33 (asserting that the lack of an appellee in
these appeals has not been problematic).
167. Williams, 156 F.3d at 92.
168. Id. (citing Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); United States v.
Polito, 856 F.2d 414, 418 (1st Cir. 1988)).
169. See id.
170. Id.
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opinion writing-do17not
constitute a sanction and provide no independent
1
basis for an appeal.
The court finally pointed out that its holding does not leave an attorney
who has been harshly criticized by a court without a remedy; attorneys still
172
have the option to file a writ of mandamus.
2. Ninth Circuit
a. Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc.
In Weissman, attorney Lawrence W. Schonbrun attempted to appeal the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California's order that
limited his ability to file objections to Americans with Disabilities Act class
action settlement agreements and included disapproving comments about
his professional conduct. 173
Even though the district court found
Schonbrun's conduct "groundless, contrived and misplaced" and
"reflect[ing] a serious lack of professionalism and good judgment," the
Ninth Circuit decided that the district court's comments were not sanctions
74
and were thus unappealable.1
The Ninth Circuit noted that, even though a court's formal reprimand
might be a sanction, it was not so in this case because the district court's
comments "[were] merely its factual findings made in support of the
Order."' 75 The court expressly agreed with the First Circuit's holding in
171. Id. Compare Williams, 156 F.3d 86, with Bowers v. NCAA, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d
Cir. 2007) (agreeing with the First Circuit that explicit reprimands are appealable sanctions,
but declining to take a side on the circuit split).
In Bowers v. NCAA, the attorneys raised an appeal from the district court's finding
that they had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) and "had willfully and in bad
faith concealed from defense counsel evidence of [the plaintiff]'s escalating substance abuse
and substance abuse treatment[,]" which led the district court to grant sanctions motions
against the plaintiff and her attorneys. Bowers, 475 F.3d at 538.
In addressing the issue of jurisdiction, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit recognized that the district court "did not impose any additional monetary or
disciplinary sanctions on [the plaintiff]'s attorneys beyond factual findings and language in
the actual order that the conduct of those attorneys merited sanctions." Id. at 542. The court
then noted that the circuits are in disagreement regarding whether-in order to be
appealable-the district court's factual finding must include explicit language of a
reprimand. Id. at 543. However, because the lower court in Bowers "explicitly stated" that
the attorneys were being sanctioned, the Third Circuit did not think it necessary to take a
side in this disagreement. Id. at 543-44. It did, however, agree with the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit that an "explicit public reprimand ...constitutes an appealable
sanction." Id. at 544. Because, in this case, the district court found that the attorneys
violated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, and the district court explicitly granted sanctions
motions against them, "[tihe order ...clearly rose above mere judicial criticism" and was
appealable. Id.
172. See Williams, 156 F.3d at 92 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2000)); see also supra note
108 and accompanying text. For a discussion about the improbability of courts granting
writs of mandamus in informal sanctions cases, see infra Part III.B.
173. See Weissman v. Quail Lodge Inc., 179 F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 1999).
174. Id. (quoting the district court's order).
175. Id. at 1199.
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Williams that "words alone will constitute a sanction only 'if they are
expressly identified as a reprimand."" 176 Because the language in the order
against Schonbrun did not constitute an explicit reprimand (thus not
a
77
sanction), the Ninth Circuit found the words in the order unappealable. 1
b. United States v. Talao
In Talao, an Assistant United States Attorney, Robin Harris, wished to
appeal a finding by the Northern District of California that she had violated
a local rule of professional conduct prohibiting communications between a
lawyer and a person also in the matter who is represented by a different
lawyer. 178
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the district court's finding that "Harris
knowingly and willfully violated a specific rule of ethical conduct" was per
se a sanction. 179 The court reasoned that the district court's finding
amounted to more than mere words and was an actual legal conclusion with
the formality of a reprimand. 180 "The requisite formality in this case [was]
apparent from the fact that the trial court found a violation of a particular
ethical rule, as opposed to generally expressing its disapproval of a lawyer's
behavior." 181 The court also added that the district court's finding of a
violation of the California rule would likely affect Harris in the same way
as a reprimand; it would probably "stigmatize Harris among her colleagues
182
and potentially could have a serious detrimental effect on her career."
8 3
Harris could also be subject to sanctions served by the California Bar.
The Ninth Circuit concluded its discussion by making it clear that "a
formal finding of a violation eliminates the need for difficult line drawing
in much the same way as a court's explicit pronouncement that its words
are intended as a sanction" 184 and that the court would not be willing to
176. Id. at 1200 (quoting Williams, 156 F.3d at 92).
177. See id.
178. See United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court

found that Harris violated Rule 2-100 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, which
provides, in part: "While representing a client, a member shall not communicate directly or
indirectly about the subject of the representation with a party the member knows to be
represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the member has consent of the other
lawyer." Id. at 1136 n.4 (citing CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2-100 (2008)); ef
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2003).
179. Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138; see also State v. Perez, 885 A.2d 178, 187 (Conn. 2005).

State v. Perez is an example of a state court of last resort agreeing with the reasoning in
United States v. Talao. Perez, 885 A.2d at 187. In Perez, the Connecticut Appellate Court

found that an attorney violated a Rule of Professional Conduct. Id. at 178. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut ruled that "the Appellate Court's finding that the plaintiff had violated
rule 3.3(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct constituted a disciplinary sanction
tantamount to a reprimand." Id. at 188.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Talao, 222 F.3d at 1138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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hear an appeal of every negative word spoken to an attomey.1 8 5 The Ninth
Circuit also addressed the concern that its holding might make judges
reluctant to find ethical violations for fear of reversal on appeal by arguing
that it is doubtful that judges would be confused about "the meaning and
1 86
effect of formal findings like the one against Harris.
3. Federal Circuit: Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States
In Precision, the U.S. Court of International Trade reprimanded an
attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice, Mikki Graves Wasler, for
making misrepresentations in a motion for reconsideration. 187 Wasler left
out parts of quotations from judicial opinions, thus altering their meanings,
88
and failed to add "emphasis added" in a footnote where it was required.
In the court's unpublished opinion, it concluded: "[A]n attorney before this
court violated [U.S. Court of International Trade] Rule 11 in signing motion
papers which contained omissions/misquotations. Accordingly, the court
89
hereby formally reprimands her."'
The Federal Circuit had to determine whether the sanction imposed by
the court represented "'a final decision of the United States Court of
International Trade." ' 190 The Federal Circuit decided that the sanction was
appealable because it was "explicit and formal" and was imposed due to a
Rule 11 violation.' 9 1 Because the Court of International Trade had used the
language "formally reprimands" in its opinion, it "obviously intended its
1 92
action to be a formal judicial action."
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1350.
190. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000)).
191. Id. at 1352.
192. Id. at 1350, 1353; cf Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys., Inc., 497 F.3d 1316 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). The appeal in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-ChinkSystems, Inc., arose out of a lawsuit
for patent infringement. Id. at 1318. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
began its jurisdiction analysis with 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), which establishes jurisdiction for
the Federal Circuit. Id. The court also noted that it "resolve[s] questions as to [its]
jurisdiction by applying the law of [the Federal] [C]ircuit, not the regional circuit from
which the case arose." Id.
The district court held the patent unenforceable because of the conduct of one of the
attorneys who had prosecuted the patent before the infringement suit began. Id. The
attorney, Michael Techner, appealed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Tennessee's finding that he had "engaged in inequitable conduct" by not informing the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office of an earlier, related lawsuit and not disclosing to the office
certain important documents. Id.
The Federal Circuit recognized that a district court's critical statements may have a
negative effect on a nonparty's reputation, "[b]ut the fact that a statement made by a court
may have incidental effects on the reputations of nonparties does not convert the court's
statement into a decision from which anyone who is criticized by the court may pursue an
appeal." Id. at 1319. The court held that "a court's order that criticizes an attorney and that
is intended to be 'a formal judicial action' in a disciplinary proceeding is an appealable
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While the Federal Circuit centered its decision around the formality of
the Court of International Trade's reprimand, it also heavily emphasized the
negative effects that a court's admonishment can have on an attorney's
professional reputation: "A lawyer's reputation is one of his most
important professional assets. Indeed, such a reprimand may have a more
serious adverse impact upon a lawyer than the imposition of a monetary
sanction." 193 The court also noted that its decision was not affected by the
194
fact that the Court of International Trade's opinion was unpublished.
"Unpublished opinions, although not then reprinted in the West Publishing
195
Company reports, may be, and frequently are, reported elsewhere."'
III: RECOMMENDING STANDING TO APPEAL A COURT'S EXPLICIT
REPRIMAND OF ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The most appropriate rule is that an attorney should be permitted to
appeal sanctions that could damage that attorney's professional reputation,
as articulated by the Tenth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits. 196 This rule accounts
for the importance of an attorney's professional reputation and recognizes
the difficulty of obtaining a writ of mandamus as a remedy. This rule also
urges judges to consider the consequences of their reprimands and whether
a less severe sanction is appropriate under the circumstances.
Part III examines the policy considerations behind the suitable rule that
attorney sanctions that cause damage to an attorney's professional
reputation should be appealable, and discusses the insufficiency of writs of
mandamus as relief. Part III.A discusses the policy considerations, which
include the significance of professional reputation and the lack of negative
consequences, associated with this rule. Part III.B argues that writs of
mandamus are rarely granted, unless in extreme circumstances, and are
therefore unlikely to relieve sanctioned attorneys.

decision, but that other kinds of judicial criticisms of lawyers' actions are not reviewable."

Id. at 1320.
The court noted that the facts in this case differ from facts in other cases concerning
an attorney who wishes to appeal a court's criticism. See id. at 1321. In Nisus, the attorney
wishing to appeal was no longer part of the underlying litigation. Teschner was merely the
attorney who prosecuted the patent and was a witness in the infringement suit. Id. "Mr.
Teschner's pre-litigation conduct was plainly outside the scope of the court's authority to
impose disciplinary sanctions, and the court's criticism of Mr. Teschner cannot reasonably
be characterized as the imposition of a disciplinary sanction against him." Id. Finally, the
Federal Circuit noted that a nonparty still has a writ of mandamus available as a remedy. Id.
at 1322 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1651); see also In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92-93 (1st Cir.
1998)). For a further explanation of the court's decision in Nisus, see Amol Parikh, Federal
Circuit Lacks Jurisdictionto Decide Appeal from Nonparty Patent Attorney, Mondaq Bus.
Briefing (Oct. 2, 2007), http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=52706.
193. Precision, 315 F.3d at 1353.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *14-15.
196. See supra Part II.B.
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A. Policy Considerations
Part III.A discusses the policy considerations related to the rule that an
attorney should be permitted to appeal a district court judge's finding of
professional misconduct. Part III.A.1 stresses the importance of an
attorney's professional reputation in his community and emphasizes the
negative effects that an informal sanction can have on that reputation. Part
III.A.2 explains that appellate litigation has not ballooned in the circuits
that allow these appeals, nor has the lack of an appellee posed a problem,
because appellate courts review the district court's original order. Finally,
Part III.A.3 argues that the Tenth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits' rule does not
place judicial candor in jeopardy.
1. Professional Reputation
An attorney's professional reputation is, without a doubt, an important
asset.' 97 Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Cooter
& Gell, articulated this by writing, "[d]espite the changes that have taken
place at the bar since I left the active practice 20 years ago, I still believe
that most lawyers are wise enough to know that their most precious asset is
their professional reputation."' 198 Having a good reputation in one's
community can affect the level of business that a lawyer receives and the
kind of clients and business that a lawyer attracts.' 99 A court's published
finding chastising an attorney will likely damage his or her professional
reputation in that attorney's legal community, and this damage "is a
cognizable and legally sufficient injury." 200 For this reason, a monetary
sanction should not be required for an appeal.
Furthermore, drawing the line at explicit and formal reprimands-rather
than allowing appeals from all written findings of attorney misconductplaces far too much emphasis on the use of the word "formal" or
"reprimand" in the finding and not enough weight on the actual effects of
the sanction. 20 1 "[A] rule requiring an explicit label as a reprimand ignores
the reality that a finding of misconduct damages an attorney's reputation
regardless of whether it is labeled as a reprimand and, instead, trumpets
form over substance. '20 2 For example, in the First and Ninth Circuits,

197. See Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., 348 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2003); Precision,
315 F.3d at 1352-53; United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000); Walker v.
City of Mesquite, 129 F.3d 831, 832 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997).
198. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 413 (1990); see also FDIC v.

Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 1988) (calling an attorney's
professional reputation "his or her bread and butter").
199. See, e.g., United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that
a lawyer's community reputation can "affect his ability to attract clients and to represent
them effectively").
200. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1168.
201. Id. at 1169; see also supra note 142 and accompanying text.
202. Butler, 348 F.3d at 1169.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

which require an explicit reprimand, 20 3 an order stating, "this attorney is
guilty of egregious misconduct and blatant unprofessional behavior" might
not be appealable, but an order stating "we formally reprimand this attorney
for his egregious misconduct and blatant unprofessional behavior" would
be appealable. Because these two separate findings would have the same
detrimental effect on the sanctioned attorney's professional reputation, they
should both be appealable.
Damage to an attorney's professional reputation is further exacerbated by
the availability of judicial opinions online. 20 4 Opposing counsel has access
to and the ability to use commercial electronic databases to read judicial
opinions, and potential clients can easily search the Internet for the name of
an attorney and find out that a district court judge has made a finding of the
attorney's professional misconduct.2 05 Because attorneys today so heavily
rely upon the Internet to generate new business, these widely accessible
206
judicial opinions can be extremely damaging to an attorney's reputation,
and potential clients likely will not perceive or consider a difference
between an "explicit" reprimand and a finding of blatant attorney
misconduct when deciding whether to hire or even to fire an attorney
because of a judicial finding.
2. The Absence of an Overwhelming Expansion of Appellate Litigation
and a Problematic Lack of Appellees
Since courts of appeals have begun allowing appeals from findings of
attorney misconduct, the "breathtaking expansion in appellate jurisdiction"

that the Seventh Circuit predicted in Bolte207 has not occurred. 208

The

courts of appeals have not had to deal with an overwhelming number of
209
appeals from nonmonetary sanctions.
This is hardly surprising in light of the abuse-of-discretion standard to be
applied, along with the fact that a sanctioned attorney must pay out-ofpocket and opportunity costs to challenge the ruling below-in addition
to facing the very real risk that the Court of Appeals will find the sanction
justified.2 10

203. See supra Parts II.C. 1-2.

204. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at * 14-15.
205. See id.
206. See id.

207. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
208. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at * 16-17. According to Leslie V.
Matlaw's argument, as of July 2007, only one more case has arisen in the Fifth Circuit since
Walker v. City of Mesquite, just four cases have arisen in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit since Butler, and only one case has arisen in the Federal Circuit since
PrecisionSpecialty Metals, Inc. v. United States. Matlaw also noted the Third Circuit case,

Bowers v. NCAA, in her argument. Id. Nisus has also been decided in the Federal Circuit
since Matlaw's petition. 497 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *17-18.
210. Id.
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It is unlikely that attorneys will risk an affirmed finding of professional
misconduct if they do not believe that they stand a chance of winning their
appeal. 21 1 Therefore, these types of appeals will be kept to a minimum.
Furthermore, the issue raised in Bolte about the lack of an appellee in
these appeals 2 12 is unproblematic. 2 13 On appeal, courts do not only review
the appellant's brief. Courts also review the original district court order,
which explains the reason for imposing the finding. 2 14 Moreover, if
unopposed appeals from monetary sanctions are allowed, then appeals from
these nonmonetary sanctions finding attorney misconduct should be heard
2 15
despite the fact that they are uncontested.
3. Uncompromised Judicial Candor
"Judicial candor is a trait strongly valued, both generally and in the
sanctions context, and discouraging it will serve only to erode public
confidence in the courts." 2 16 However, the potential appealability of a
district court judge's finding of attorney misconduct will not make judges
hesitant to impose these sanctions and speak truthfully about an attorney's
wrongdoings, nor does it remove their right to do so. In fact, a judge should
only reprimand attorneys through a finding in an order if the attorney's
offense is serious enough to warrant such a sanction. 2 17 If so, then the
attorney has undoubtedly been "directly aggrieve[d]," 2 18 and deserves the
right to an appeal. 219 If a judge believes that an attorney's conduct provides
adequate grounds for a finding of misconduct in a written opinion, that
judge will likely understand that the severity of the sanction makes it
appealable. Therefore, a judge's candor will not be sacrificed.
Furthermore, if judges are worried about their findings being subject to
appeal, they do not necessarily have to make a written finding of attorney
220
misconduct in order to address and remedy an attorney's poor conduct.
Even if it is a judge's duty to regulate attorney conduct, 22 1 judges have a
211. Id.
212. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.

213. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *18; see supra note 136.
214. See supra note 136 and accompanying text; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 33, at *18 ("[S]ince alleged misconduct occurs before the trial court, fullydeveloped and readily-available records provide a firm basis for appellate court review; little
adversarial assistance is needed to re-construct the facts behind the alleged wrongdoing.")

(citing 13A

CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.10 (2d
ed. 1984)).
215. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 33, at *18; see also In re Williams, 156
F.3d 86, 97 (1st Cir. 1998) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).

216. Williams, 156 F.3d at 92 (citing Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game: Public
Perceptions of the Judiciary,30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 909, 915 (1996)).
217. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the principle that a
sanction's severity must correspond to the gravity of the attorney's wrongdoing).
218. Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs., 348 F.3d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 2003).
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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wide variety of actions from which to choose when controlling their
courtrooms and tackling behavior "that sullies the underlying litigation and
judicial system," 222 many of which are not appealable. 223 Only if "the
district court makes a formal, particularized finding of misconduct that
exists independent of the court's other factual and legal findings" will the
finding be appealable. 2 24 Judges can still "reflect[] their displeasure with
the conduct of those they are charged with controlling 225 without the use
226
of appealable sanctions.
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges 2 27 requires "appropriate
action" when a federal judge notices another judge or lawyer's professional
misconduct. 228 "Appropriate action," according to the Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (used by state judges), includes "direct communication
with the judge or lawyer who has committed the violation." 229 This
indicates that a judge's appropriate course of action may be to communicate
one-on-one with an attorney to express the court's disapproval. Also, the
Fifth Circuit suggested in Thomas that "[w]hat is 'appropriate' may be a
warm friendly discussion on the record [] [or] a hard-nose reprimand in
open court," showing that judges have other alternatives to monetary
sanctions or public orders finding attorney misconduct. 230 "A trial judge
still retains broad, unappealable authority... to make pejorative comments
or criticisms of a lawyer's performance without engaging in deliberate or
'231
published chastisement.
For example, hard-nosed and even caustic criticism of a lawyer's
behavior, when intended to put a stop to that lawyer's misconduct, or
even when the criticism is intended to control less offensive attorney
behavior such as duplicative questioning of a witness or introduction of
irrelevant evidence, and not intended as a sanction, are232all ordinary efforts
at courtroom administration and may not be appealed.
In fact, the Supreme Court has held that "expressions of impatience,
hostility toward counsel, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and anger by judges"
are unappealable. 233 Therefore, judges' "expressi[ons] [of] disapproval of a
222. McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1442.

223. See supranotes 60-64 and accompanying text.
224. In re Harris, 51 F. App'x 952, 956 (6th Cir. 2002); see also supra notes 65-69 and
accompanying text.
225. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1998).
226. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 8, at 1345.
227. See Judicial Conference, supra note 15.
228. See id., Canon 3(B)(3); see also supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
229. Supra note 20 and accompanying text.
230. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting FED. R.
Civ. P. 11).

231. In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86, 98 (1st Cir. 1998) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (citing United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Hook v.
McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 355-56 (7th Cir. 1996); and Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp.,
57 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1995) as examples of judicial actions that do not constitute
sanctions because they are not used for punishment).
233. Id. (citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 556 (1994)).

2008]

APPEALING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

lawyer's behavior" 2 34 are protected, but sanctions which are "intended to
punish or deter"2 35 should be appealable.
Judges must sanction or reprimand an attorney in proportion to the
gravity of the attorney's misconduct. 2 36 "Judges are prone to forget the
sting of public criticism delivered from the bench. '237 Therefore, with so
many other alternatives available with which to control the conduct of the
lawyers, judges should use care and specificity when sanctioning
attorneys. 238 Before sanctioning attorneys, judges should ask themselves
239 Most
whether an attorney's conduct has "taint[ed] the judicial process."
lawyers will not overlook a reprimand from a judge-even if it is privateso discussing an attorney's
misconduct in chambers or sidebar might be the
"appropriate action, '240 that is, "the least severe sanction adequate to serve
24 1
the purpose."
A judge's written findings of misconduct can have grave effects on an
attorney's professional reputation, and thus, should be appealable. 242 If a
judge finds the attorney's conduct so reprehensible as to justify a finding
that can have significant negative effects on the attorney's career, the judge
should be aware that he or she is punishing the attorney with direct
consequences and that the sanction will be appealable. Therefore, if a judge
is worried about appeals, and an attorney's behavior can be regulated
through less severe measures, the judge can reprimand the attorney
privately, express his or her disapproval, and demand a change in behavior.
If a judge finds that an attorney definitely has acted so unprofessionally as
to warrant a public chastisement in a written opinion, the judge will
probably impose this sanction without fear that the finding will be reversed
on appeal. Also, attorneys are unlikely to even bring appeals if they do not
expect to win.24 3 Therefore, if the misconduct was so blatant as to justify
the court's sanction, judges will not worry about being reversed on appeal,
and their candor will not be in jeopardy.
B. Insufficiency of Writs of Mandamus
Those courts of appeals that only allow appeals from monetary sanctions
or require explicit formality of sanctions often conclude their opinions with
a reminder that aggrieved attorneys still have the option to file for a writ of
234. United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000).
235. Williams, 156 F.3d at 98 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
236. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
237. Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting

Schwarzer, supra note 24, at 201-02).
238. MacDraw, Inc. v. CIT Group Equip. Fin., Inc., 73 F.3d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1996).

239. McMorrow et al., supra note 4, at 1442; see also supra notes 13-14 and
accompanying text.
240. See supra note 18-20 and accompanying text.

241. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878.
242. See supra Part III.A.1.
243. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

mandamus against the district court. 24 4 However, the writ of mandamus "is
seldom issued and its use is discouraged." 245 Writs of mandamus are
issued in serious circumstances, such as to compel a judge to preside over a
second trial in a criminal case that originally ended in a mistrial; 246 to stop a
judge who wanted to dismiss an indictment without the proper authority to
do so;247 and to prohibit a judge from ignoring a recent court of appeals
ruling. 248 It is unlikely that a court of appeals will find that a district
court's final order reprimanding an attorney's conduct warrants a writ of
mandamus. "Moreover, it is within a court's discretion to refrain from
issuing the writ even when the requirements for mandamus are technically
' 249
satisfied. The availability of the writ 'does not compel its exercise."'
Because the writ of mandamus is such a "drastic remedy," 250 it seems
unlikely that an attorney who has been sanctioned will be granted a writ of
mandamus against the district court judge who sanctioned him or her. In
order for an appellate court to issue a writ of mandamus, the court must find
"extraordinary circumstances" and a "judicial usurpation of power."'25 1
Because the decision to sanction an attorney and the choice of sanction is
highly discretionary, 2 52 appellate courts are not likely to find that a district
court judge abused his or her discretionary authority in reprimanding an
attorney, and thus, issue a writ of mandamus. 2 53 Therefore, in a jurisdiction
that does not permit an attorney to appeal, the difficulty of obtaining a writ
of mandamus can leave aggrieved attorneys with no relief.
CONCLUSION

It is extremely important that attorneys have standing to appeal a court's
finding that they have acted unprofessionally because this type of sanction
can cause irreparable harm to an attorney's professional reputation and thus
to the attorney's business. For example, if a company seeking products
liability defense counsel in Cleveland, Ohio looked up the name "Lawrence
Sutter" on the search engine Google, it could learn several facts about
Sutter. The company could learn that Sutter attended the University of
244. See Seymour v. Hug, 485 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Williams, 156 F.3d
86, 93 (1st Cir. 1998); Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984).
245. Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 F.2d 1062, 1069 (3d Cir. 1988).
246. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 79,
110.28, at 347 (citing United States v. Byran,
393 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1968)).
247. See id. (citing United States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1969)).
248. See id. 110.28, at 348 (citing Erie Bank v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo.,
362 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1966)).
249. In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Lusardi, 855
F.2d at 1070).
250. See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 104 (1967).
251. Id.
252. See Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
253. See, e.g., Bolte v. Home Ins. Co., 744 F.2d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 1984). The court of

appeals suggested that an aggrieved attorney's appropriate course of action is to seek a writ
of mandamus, but admitted that it refused to issue a writ of mandamus for the attorneys in
this case.
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Akron School of Law and that he has been named an Ohio Super Lawyer
for the past several years. 254 However, the company could also learn that
Sutter was the attorney sanctioned by the court in Lasar through a written
order finding "egregious" misconduct and "twisted testimony. '255 Upon
finding this information about Sutter, through a simple "Google" search, the
company might justifiably decide to hire different counsel. Sutter will then
have lost business because of an informal sanction, which might have been
reversed on appeal in a circuit allowing appeals of a district court's finding
of unprofessional behavior.
Despite the immeasurable injury that a court's finding of misconduct
can have on an attorney's professional reputation, the circuit courts do not
agree on a standard governing the appealability of a court's finding that
may be harmful to an attorney's reputation. The circuit courts have written
a mix of opinions articulating under what circumstances an attorney has
standing to appeal a court's informal sanction. The Seventh Circuit's
stance ignores the severe and lasting harm that an informal sanction, though
nonmonetary, is likely to have on an attorney's professional life.
Furthermore, the First and Ninth Circuits give far too much weight to the
inclusion of the words "formal" or "reprimand" in the opinion. This view
overlooks the detrimental power behind a court's reprimand, despite the
formality of the written admonishment. Because line drawing neglects the
harm that can be inflicted on an attorney's reputation, regardless of the
written reprimand's form, and a writ of mandamus is unlikely to be issued
in these cases, attorneys should be permitted to appeal these judicial orders
finding attorney misconduct that do not constitute mere judicial criticism.

254. Super Lawyers, http://www.superlawyers.com/ohio/lawyer/Lawrence-A-Sutter/ab8a
a7a9-d53b-4fc5-a8c5-ecb326ebfl59.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
255. See Posting of George Wallace
to Declarations and Exclusions,
http://declarationsandexclusions.typepad.com/weblog/2005/03/safety-tips-for.html (Mar. 4,
2005, 14:48 EST); Public.Resource.Org, Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., http://legal.rights.
com/F.3d/399/399.F3d.1101.03-35093.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) (posting Ninth
Circuit opinion). For information about the Lasar case, see supra notes 30-31, 36 and
accompanying text.

Notes & Observations

